Once committed to phasing out nuclear power, Sweden has reversed course, not only lifting the ban on new reactors but also introducing government frameworks to accelerate investments and deployment. The pivot repositions nuclear alongside hydro and wind power as a pillar of the country’s plans for a fossil-free electricity system by 2040.
Today, Sweden’s nuclear roadmap includes commissioning two large-scale reactors to add 2.5GW of capacity by 2035 and the equivalent of 10 new reactors, with a push for smaller modular reactors (SMRs), by 2045. According to GlobalData, the country is on course to reach 8.2GW in nuclear capacity and 59.8TWh in annual generation by 2035.
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Carl Berglöf, national nuclear power coordinator of Sweden’s Ministry of Climate and Enterprise, speaks to Power Technology about what’s driving the country’s nuclear revival and the challenges and opportunities ahead.
Jackie Park (JP): Sweden has historically relied on a mix of energy sources, with nuclear capacity having been capped but recently lifted. Why has the country seen this renewed momentum for nuclear?
Carl Berglöf (CB): Initially, we had a policy to phase out nuclear energy by 2010. That didn’t happen, and the phase-out goal moved to 2040, with the aim of having a fully renewable electricity system by then. But this changed in a stepwise development since 2018.
2018 was a very warm and dry summer – a heatwave and very low wind. During this time, nuclear provided up to 75% of electricity. It was a warning that we need firm capacity that can always deliver in challenging weather conditions.
Then, there was the election in the autumn of 2018, when nuclear energy became a major point of discussion. This was followed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report on 1.5°C pathways, in which the role of nuclear was highlighted. This sparked the debate in Sweden on the relation between nuclear power and our climate goals.
In 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy crisis made it clear that, since we closed half of Sweden’s nuclear power plants, we have exposed ourselves to vulnerability in the functionality of the system. It is more difficult to transport electricity if we don’t have firm capacity at both ends of the lines. This also means volatile electricity prices – both temporally and geographically. But if we had hydropower in the north and nuclear power in the south, electricity transfer would be more resilient across the country and the price differences smaller.
Also, in relation to the war in Ukraine, energy security became an even more important issue. Swedish consumers noticed with their pockets that small disturbances to the electricity system may give system-wide price effects and may feed inflation.
All these aspects – weather conditions, price variations, climate goals, system challenges and energy security – pointed to nuclear power as a necessity. It simultaneously addresses society-wide issues, and a large part of the public have understood this now. That is why there was a policy change after the 2022 election. It was the first time in over 40 years that we had a fully pro-nuclear government, and that changed everything.
JP: It sounds like it was a perfect storm for nuclear to revive. You touched on challenges with electricity transfer in Sweden, where there are shortages in power transmission capacity from the north to the south. Can you elaborate on how nuclear can help overcome this?
CB: There are two parts to this.The first relates to system challenges and the capability of the transmission system operator to fulfil its obligations regarding operational security. Nuclear power provides services that the transmission system operator needs. That helps them allocate more capacity to the market using the existing power lines.
Number two is the need to increase the capability of adding new consumption to the system. Over the last 10 to 15 years, we have added a lot of wind power. But wind power is variable, so it doesn’t allow grid operators to allocate more demand unless you also add much more grid infrastructure. The result of the wind power expansion in Sweden is that we have overcapacity in energy over the year, but we cannot consume it in every second. That is why Sweden exports so much electricity.
JP: There is traditional nuclear, then there are newer technologies like SMRs. What role do you see next-generation nuclear technologies playing in Sweden’s future energy system, and how soon do you think they could become widespread?
CB: Conventional SMRs, like light-water SMRs, are a proven technology for experienced countries like Sweden, the UK, Canada and others, so I’m hopeful that it is possible to get licences within a decent timeframe. Of course, there is also a need to develop supply chains, which may cause delays and other challenges. But if everything goes according to plan, conventional SMRs could be online in Sweden before the middle of the next decade.
However, SMRs are a very wide field. The regulations we have are not tailor-made for specific concepts, so there will always be hurdles with new designs.
When it comes to more advanced nuclear technologies, the providers of these technologies have more to prove before we can really see how fast things could move. Lead-cooled reactors, gas-cooled reactors or molten salt reactors are further away from commercialisation.
But the Swedish nuclear programme is quite big, so I think there is room for advanced technologies too. New types of reactors might be suitable for applications that conventional technologies are not – for example, high-temperature process heat and district heating. In the end, the application of the technology will determine whether they get built and the speed at which it can happen.
JP: You’ve mentioned how public perception of nuclear has been improving. How is the Swedish government working to further build trust and confidence in new nuclear builds?
CB: It is important for the government to show that they deliver. The Swedish programme is a bit different from some other countries in that the government doesn’t own the projects. The government sets the conditions, but the companies, or the market, decide whether to build.
But the government can still show that they can deliver by providing the regulatory framework and the financing model to demonstrate that they are serious about the development and potential. This is already happening in Sweden, with the Riksdag (Parliament) last May approving the government’s proposal to provide state aid for companies looking to build new nuclear reactors.
But gaining public support is mostly up to the applicant. They need to have a good dialogue with the municipality and community concerned, because ultimately you need their support to get a government permit for the facility. So, it is really the applicant’s responsibility to gain acceptance at the local level. On the national level, it is politics and policy.
JP: The financing model that you mentioned has come into effect in August 2025. How has it facilitated the Swedish nuclear industry since?
CB: First, it has opened the opportunity for state-backed funding, which is essential. Without that, it would be very difficult to build new nuclear.
Second, it has established confidence in the future demand for reactors. The government has announced a programme, signalling to the industry that this is not a one-off; it is a programme involving several units. That signal is also directed to the supply chain, making it attractive to invest in Sweden and become part of the Swedish nuclear ecosystem.
The financing model provides real economic incentive. The government will initially fund the first half (5GW) of the announced programme, and later we will evaluate whether the full 10GW is needed; maybe 5GW will be enough. Depending on the development of electricity demand, perhaps later there could be a new support scheme. By that time, hopefully we will understand better how to set up and build projects, so the need for support might be lower.
JP: Speaking of supply chains, Sweden voted to lift the 2018 ban on uranium mining last year. How do you see this influencing the Swedish nuclear sector, and are there plans to address the midstream bottleneck – conversion and enrichment – given Europe’s current reliance on external providers?
CB: I think lifting the uranium mining ban has limited relevance to new nuclear constructions at this time. The new regulation will make mining in Sweden more attractive, rather than being a tool for new nuclear power.
The Swedish strategy assumes access to uranium at the international market. So far, the government has not expressed any front-end strategy. In my reports to the government, I have highlighted the need to address this issue in dialogue with other countries in the future. When the demand for nuclear fuel is increased, we will proactively act to secure long-term access to processed uranium. But first, we have to get projects started in Sweden.
JP: What are the greatest barriers for the Swedish nuclear industry right now, and how is your office working to address those challenges?
CB: I would say securing the conditions for a developed supply chain and a plan for skills and workforce development.
We are currently interviewing different stakeholders to identify specific supply chain hurdles, but what I’ve observed is that nuclear has quite a high threshold for qualification, in terms of quality and other standards. That means supply chain companies must make investments to meet those requirements. This results in low competition, as not many companies are ready to do this. I regard this as a market failure, and the government is working to address this, but I don’t have a full answer yet.
The other issue is that, even with companies, both domestic and international, willing to make these commitments, there is a lack of visibility – potential suppliers may not realise they can participate in our ecosystem. Sweden lacks a dedicated trade association that gathers and connects stakeholders. They exist for wind power and other sectors, but not nuclear.
I have also recommended that the government cooperate with countries in the region on supply chain development. Countries in Northern Europe are relatively small, so we will not be able to build nuclear power plants entirely by ourselves. We should establish a framework for cooperation and early notification of activities to avoid creating bottlenecks for each other.
As for skills and workforce development, there are initiatives, but no unified strategy or oversight. I’ve looked to the UK, Poland and France to learn from their experiences and recommended to the government that the Swedish Energy Agency should lead this. I’m not too worried because Sweden has a strong foundation – having existing nuclear operations, the infrastructure for competence development and nuclear-focussed academic programmes – but more structured planning is needed.
JP: What is one thing industry should be aware of right now about the development of nuclear power in Sweden?
CB: We are looking at a new licensing model, sent to Parliament last month for approval. It is based on the Finnish model, with an early government approval, which would give applicants clarity on whether society supports the project. Broad questions would be answered at that stage – political issues, whether the applicant is credible, site suitability and the views of the municipality involved. The detailed work would then follow.
Today, it works the other way around. The applicant must spend several years preparing detailed applications for environmental and nuclear permits, and only afterwards do they know whether society wants the project. By then, nearly a decade could have passed.
If approved by Parliament, it will enter into force 17 June 2026, and the government accepts applications filed from 11 March 2026.
This conversation is only part of the full dialogue. We continue the discussion with Carl Berglöf in our upcoming podcast episode, going live next Tuesday (7 April). Tune in as we explore:
- Nuclear’s competitiveness against renewables
- Unlocking investments: policy stability and financing
- Deep dive into new government frameworks
- Sweden’s edge in pursuing nuclear leadership
Frequently asked questions
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What triggered Sweden’s shift from a nuclear phase-out to building new reactors?
Sweden's policy turnaround was driven by 2040, a combination of factors: the push for a fossil-free power system by 2040, extreme weather exposing the need for firm power, power transfer constraints between the north and south, volatile electricity prices and rising energy security concerns.
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How will nuclear new builds help Sweden solve grid bottlenecks and price volatility?
Nuclear supports Sweden's grid stability by unlocking more capacity on existing lines. It also enables new consumption more reliable than from intermittent renewables without constant grid expansion.
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What role will SMRs play in Sweden, and when could they realistically arrive?
Conventional light-water SMRs are seen as the nearest-term option because the technology is relatively proven for experienced nuclear nations, though supply chain readiness could slow progress. If plans hold, Sweden could have SMRs operating before the mid-2030s, while advanced designs remain further from commercial rollout.
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How is Sweden accelerating investments and deployment for new nuclear projects?
A new state-backed financing model provides certainty for investors in the Swedish nuclear landscape. Sweden has also proposed a new licensing pathway that would guarantee clarity for projects earlier on, potentially cutting years of uncertainty before detailed permitting begins.
